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1. Introduction1
Since the end of last Century labour migration bas become a major feature of societies in Southern
Africa. Much attention bas been paid to thé labour migration from thé so called 'BLS countries'
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) to South Africa (see, for example, Elkan 1978, Kowet 1978, De
Vletter 1985, Whiteside 1992). The single most important feature of this labour migration is that it
is circular (Elkan 1978:145) and purely temporary, hardly ever for more than two years. After that
migrants return home, though thé likelihood is that in thé course of their lives they will migrate
several times. Reasons for this circular - or oscillating - migration are that thé South African
Government does in fact not permit migrants to stay longer than two years and accommodation is
only provided for thé worker alone. The migrant's family bas to stay behind in the country of
origin. Moreover, even if thé South African Government would allow long-term permits and
families to corne with thé migrant, it is thé question whether thé whole family would migrate.
Living on communal lands, families have free accommodation and part of the total family income
is provided by produce of the farm, being either food for own consumption or cash crops. As thé
System of communal land tenure does not permit sale of land, farms cannot be sold and if sale was
allowed families would not do so, because due to thé absence of borrowing facilities thé priée
received for the farm would lay far below ils expected future stream of income (Elkan 1978:146-7).
Although labour migration to South Africa is a less pronounced feature of Swazi society than, for
instance, in Lesotho (see Murray 1978 and 1981), its impact on ail levels of Swazi society cannot be
denied. A number of publications appeared on this subject (Booth 1986 and 1988, Daniel 1982,
Fransman 1982, Kowet 1978, Levin 1985, Low 1986, Neocosmos 1987, Rosen-Prinz and Prinz 1978,
Russell 1984 and 1988, De Vletter 1982, 1983). Most of these studies deal with migrant labour at a
macro-level and analyze nation-wide figures of labour migration, investigate its causes and discuss
its economie, social and political implications. This paper wants to give a contribution to the
discussion on what migrant labour does to the Swazi homestead. It is analyzed in what respects
migrant labour might affect the homestead as a solidarity group providing social security to its
members. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the conditions which makes a group a solidarity
group and how these apply to the Swazi homestead. In the Sections 3 till 6 an attempt is made to
assess the influence of migrant labour on the characteristic features of a solidarity group by
comparing a group of homesteads with migrant labourers in South Africa and a group of
homesteads without them. Data are derived from a 1990 survey among 195 homesteads. From this
survey 83 cases are used for this paper.
A few qualifications have to made before starting the discussion. Firstly, it is the homestead as a
solidarity group which is the focus of the discussion. No attention is paid to the migrant him- or
herself. In other words, the focus is on those who are left behind on the homestead. Secondly, the
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study is restricted to homesteads situated on communal land in the rural areas, so-called Swazi
Nation Land (SNL).2 Thirdly, the analysis only includes those homesteads which have migrant
labourers in South Africa and those who have no wage labourers at all. A substantial part of Swazi
homesteads (39.4 percent in the sample) has one or more members doing wage-labour in
Swaziland. These members are either resident or are absent during the week but return in the
weekends. The latter are also migrants, but can be denoted as so called "commuters". This form of
migration differs strongly from the migration to South Africa whereby migrants return once a year
and is therefore excluded from the analysis. In addition 17.6 percent of the homesteads in the
survey have members working in Swaziland as well as members working in South Africa. Also this
group of homesteads is excluded from the analysis in order to make the différences between
homesteads without and with migrant labour in South Africa more clear. This means that the
sample analyzed in this paper contains 83 homesteads of which 37 homesteads have migrant
labourers in South Africa and 46 homesteads have not. Although the number of observations is not
large, it is thought large enough to indicate some main tendencies and différences. The fourth and
last qualification is that the survey of 1990 was not meant to find explicit data on the spécifie
questions addressed in this paper. Not all propositions in this paper can be sustained by data from
this survey, and findings from other sources are used where necessary.
2. The Homestead as Solidarity Group
The homestead as basic social and economie unit in Swaziland has been widely discussed by social
scientists (see, among others, Allen 1973, Holleman 1964, Hughes 1972, Kuper 1947 and 1963,
Marwick 1966, Neocosmos 1987, Ngubane 1983, Russell 1983, Sibisi 1979, De Vletter 1983). What
exactly is a homestead? Hughes (1972:69) indicates that sometimes the term homestead refers to a
physical entity (buts, cattle byre and arable lands), and sometimes il refers to a spécifie social
group. To avoid confusion I adhère to the common practice of most social scientists in Swaziland
to indicate with the homestead the social group.
The term "homestead" is a translation of the siSwati word "umuti", indicating a family group living
in a small family settlement. It is a family group whose members live together in conséquence of
being close kin (Ngubane 1983:95). In this sense the umuti differs from the village, where also most
or even all of its members may be related, but without an inherent connection between kinship and
proximity. Whereas a village has a resident headman or some other form of authority recognized
as responsible for the affairs of the village as such, the head of the Swazi type of family settlement
is simply the head of the family group. Since his position dépends on how he is related to the other
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members, and not primarily on where hè lives, hè remains the head of the group even during a
prolonged absence (Ngubane 1983:95). "Homestead" is not entirely satisfactory as translation of
umuti, but it serves to highlight that it is neither a village nor simply a household; it may well
contain several households. These households (tindlu, sing, indlu) may centre around the head-
man's wife or wives and their (unmarried) children, and/or around married brothers or sons with
their wives and children. The woman in the household bas her own kitchen and sleeping huts, and
her own fields and cattle allotted for the use of her household. By dint of her own industry and
some assistance frorn her husband she produces crops (mainly maize) from the fields to provide
food for the unit. Each household has its own food store. However, some of the land allocated to
the hörnestead is not distributed to the tindlu, but worked upon together by all homestead
members. This land is called "grandmother's field" and its fruits accrue to the homestead head. He
may keep the produce for himself, but more likely he will keep it in store and redistribute it among
those households of which the supplies are inadequate to meet its neëds. Whatever a woman earns
by bartering some of her produce accrues to her own household. The same holds for the husband,
although some of his earnings may accrue to the homestead as a whole in the form of food,
agricultural inputs and Utensils. Within homesteads, then, households can be seen as units of
consumption and partly also as units of production. Nowadays, however, multi-household
homesteads are less and less the rule, and the latest population census (Central Statistical Office
1986) found that only 16.5 percent of the homesteads on SNL contained two or more households.
In my survey I found 14.4 percent of the homesteads to have two or more households.
It can safely be stated that the homestead is the baste unit of Swazi society, and as such it has
several functions in Swazi society. These functions can be labelled as economie, educational,
cérémonial and legal (Marwick 1966:43). Customarily, one of its functions also is to provide social
protection for thé individual member against économie or social shortfalls. As Ngubane states
(1983:103): "..., a Swazi is also entitled to assistance and protection from his umuti (underlining
Ngubane) in time of need, as when he is ill or infirm, disabled or too old to fend for himself, or
else afflicted with misfortune. In short, it provides him with a comprehensive security he can
scarcely find in any alternative institution or body." As in many other societies, in Swaziland social
protection is internalised within thé domestic unit of production and consumption (see Zacher
1988, Freiburg-Strauss and Jung 1988), i.e., thé homestead. Although many studies on thé
homestead (Kuper 1947 and 1963, Marwick 1966, Ngubane 1983, Russell 1983 and 1984) emphasize
its "social security rôle" and thé entitlement of thé homestead members to this social security, thé
important question remains whether or not the homestead as a social group is actually able to
meet the demands that corne from within thé homestead. As Partsch (1983:62-8) noted, several
économie and social conditions hâve to be fulfilled before a social group can also act as a solidarity
group, i.e., a group in which means are distributed from productive members to members who are
not able to provide themselves with means.3 Let me review these conditions and apply them to thé
homestead.
3
 The term "means" sounds vague, but by using this term I indicate that not only goods
(commodities), but also money and labour (services) are included in thé set of items that may be
redistributed.
First of all, in order to redistribute means, sufficient means have to be produced and become
available within the homestead äs a whole. In général this means that each productive homestead
member should produce more than necessary for bis or her own minimum standard of living. A
minimum standard of living can be defïned in terms of capabilities, i.e., the abilities of an
individual to achieve minimum levels of certain basic functionings (such as being adequately
nourished, minimally sheltered, and so on) (see Sen 1985, Drèze and Sen 1991). In developing
countries, and also in Swaziland, the majority of people live in poverty or deprivation which is the
failure to have the ability to achieve minimum levels of certain basic functionings. Given this
genera! phenomenon of poverty one could easily conclude that within the homestead no one is able
to reach a certain minimum standard of living that, consequently, social protection does not work.
But, as Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:231) conclude, deprivation does not lead to an abrupt
disruption of social security. Deprivation generally results from a graduai worsening of conditions
under which homestead production takes place, and ils conséquences for the homestead as
solidarity group will therefore also become gradually clear. Studies on economie differentiation
among homesteads (De Vletter 1983, Neocosmos 1987, Income and Expenditure Survey 1985)
make clear that the conditions are not the same for all homesteads; homesteads differ considerably
in their capacity to raise means, so that the Standard of living of homesteads differs accordingly. It
is noted, then, that also the capacity of homesteads to function as solidarity group will, among
other things, vary with its economie position. In Section 6 of this paper I return to this discussion.
A second condition for the solidarity group is that the ratio non-productive members / productive
members cannot be too high, in order to prevent a unacceptable bürden on the productive
members of the group. Although an acceptable upper bound to this so-called dependency ratio
cannot be given, an increasing number of non-productive members would either lead to all
homestead members having less than sufficient means when the remaining productive homestead
members keep sharing their produce with the non-productive, or it would lead to lower and lower
means available for the non-productive members when productive members want to sustain their
own standard of living. Whether or not this ratio is too high for a homestead cannot be said a
priori as the ratio differs through the development cycle of the homestead. Low (1986) distin-
guished five stages in the "life-cycle" of the homestead whereby the homestead develops from small
to large to small again: establishment, expansion, consolidation, décline and fission. Each stage
corresponds with different sizes and dependency ratios, which are highest and lowest respectively in
the consolidation stage. At the same time Low found strong corrélations between the stage of
development and economie performance of the homestead. In further sections I use this classifica-
tion to distinguish among the 86 homesteads. For the way in which homesteads are classified I
refer to Appendix A.
The two conditions mentioned above can be denoted as primarily economie conditions for a
solidarity group. Social conditions are equally important. Sufficient means available and a relatively
favourable dependency ratio do as such not guarantee that thé social group also functions as a
solidarity group. For a social group to be a solidarity group its size, composition, stability over time
and redistribution principle(s) are also of utmost importance.
The size of the group is important because it détermines on how many members the bürden falls
to take care of the improductive members in the group. The larger the size the less the bürden for
each productive member. Partsch (1983:65) suggests that a group, therefore, should be larger than
the nuclear family to discuss in a sensible way social protection within family groups. Homestead
sizes do vary widely depending on both the stage of the development cycle and the extent to which
they contain one or more households. In my sample of 195 homesteads the average homestead size
was 10.1 persons, but behind this average a variation could be found from l tul 30 persons
constituting the homestead. 83.9 percent of the sample homesteads had a size over 5 persons and
45.0 percent had 11 members or more. Just a minority of the sample homesteads (10.2 percent)
could be labelled as a nuclear family group (see also Section 4).
The composition of the group must be such that at any point in time sufficient members are there
to transfer means to the unproductive group members. In other words, the composition should be
such that not all members face the same risks and do not lose their productive power or produc-
tion at the same time. Following Platteau (1991:139) one could say that the relative absence of
covariate risks makes a group better suited to function as solidarity group. Several features of the
social group constituting the homestead do meet this condition. First of all homesteads contain
several générations; in 60 percent of the sample cases, homesteads contained three générations or
more. Social contingencies like oid age and age-bound diseases are not likely to happen then
among all members at the same time. Besides, both sexes are present on the homestead. Because
of a strict gender division of labour by which women work in domestic activities and subsistance
agriculture and men are engaged in wage labour or other income generating activities, the présence
of both sexes guarantees a spread of different productive activities over different homestead
members. When the production of one or a few members falls short because of economie or social
contingencies, not all production is lost. To some extent, then, the homestead is always able to
raise means when one of its members fall short. However, to the extent that homestead members
have common risks, like the risk to be infected by diseases or natura! disasters, or are engaged in
the same type of productive activities the homestead will be less able to cope with the consé-
quences and social protection will have to corne from outside the homestead.
The durability and stability in time of the group is the third social condition. For all members it
must be certain that the group will continue to exist when contingencies occur and during the
whole period in which conséquences are feit as resuit of the contingency. Therefore, especially
social groups that are able to replace departing members over time are suitable as solidarity
groups. Extended families or clans are perfect solidarity groups from this point of view. Although it
would be too opportunistic to suggest that the homestead is an extended family in its strict sensé,
its continuing existence is certain to its members. Because the relations between homestead
members are based on kinship des, the individual becomes member of the a kingroup when hè or
she is born and will stay member till his or her death. In this way the homestead is far better
suited as solidarity group than groups based on neighbourhood, friendship or contract. In contrast
to the latter forms, kinship exists relatively independent from the will of the individual and will
survive the particular life time of an individual. Furthermore, Partsch (1983:100-1) states that this
condition is best fulfilled through kin groups of which the existence is not threatened when one of
the members falls out. In two-generation families the marriage of the children or the death of the
parents will finish the existence of the group. In three-generation families this problem does not
occur. Through birth and marriage new members are included and the présence of three
générations ensures a relatively easy care for children and elderly.
A final social condition for a group to be a solidarity group is that a principle must be présent that
obliges members to support other members when necessary. There must be norms or values that
force members to redistribute means from those who hâve to those who hâve not. The existence of
such a "normative insurance" (Partsch 1983:67) is a prerequisite because it ensures that individual
members will contribute and will contribute sufficiently at times that this is needed. Customary
rules, moral principles and community norms constitute, therefore, a powerful means of assuring
each group member that coopération will ensue and thé obligation created will be enforced
(Platteau 1991:139). Also within thé homestead such moral principles exist. Ngubane (1983:104)
says on this point: "it is thé umuti (underlining Ngubane) which has first daim on a member, for its
support of its members and especially those of his own house (indlu, A.L.) as well as generally for
thé maintenance of thé physical structure, its land and its livestock, as his or her circumstances
permit and his or her âge, sex and marital status dictate more specifically. Even if only by sending
money, or bringing goods when he or she can, he or she should make his or her contribution". In
sum, homestead membership implies also having économie obligations and rights towards other
homestead members. Thèse obligations and rights are, however, highly dépendent on sex, âge,
marital status and someone's social position in thé homestead.
As said thé gender division of labour forces women into domestic and (subsistence) agricultural
activities. This results in a restricted access to monetary earnings of female homestead members
and therefore women made traditionally their économie contributions to thé homestead directly in
labour (Russell 1984:19). More spécifie to thé rôle of women in thé homestead as solidarity group
their contribution is derived from the gender division of labour: as domestic activities also include
daily care of thé children, thé elderly, sick, disabled and so on, women hâve an important rôle in
thé provision of social protection to thé unproductive on thé homestead. Mâle members hâve far
more access to monetary earnings and their contribution includes thé provision of goods,
agricultural inputs and money. In case unproductive members need money for treatment or spécifie
goods, mâle members will be responsible for this.
Age is another important factor determining obligations and rights within thé homestead. Children
have few obligations in Swazi society, although they are expected to contribute to labour like cattle
herding (young boys) or some light domestic activities (girls). When women and men are married
they have reached complete man- and womanhood in Swazi society. In this stage both married man
and women are mainly responsible for the welfare of both thé younger and thé elder générations.
When they themselves become older they hâve and less to do with économie activities. Younger
générations will take thé major part in thé économie pursuits of thé homestead, and thé older
people hâve an increasing important position in thé social sphère (Marwick 1966:68-71).
The marital status of thé homestead member influences thé direction of the économie obligations.
The unmarried female stay at her parents' homestead and her labour efforts and her earnings
accrue to her parents. When she marries her productive efforts will accrue to her husbands'
(fathers') homestead. A young unmarried mâle is in thé same position as an unmarried woman.
His earaings should accrue for the largest parts to other members of the homestead, especially his
father. When hè is married earnings accrue to his own household, even though strong obligations
to other homestead members continue, but these resuit from âge or kb relations rather than from
being married or not.
Although Swazi make a distinction between homestead membership and kinship ties, in practice
these relationships often coïncide. But kinship in itself détermines also obligations and rights
homestead members have towards each other. Within the homestead the main kin relations are
between children and parents, among sibhngs, and between wife and husband (affinai kin
relations). The obligations and rights between children and parents change over a life-time. Parents
are obliged to give to their children as long they are not able to produce their own means. As soon
as the latter happens children begin to take care of their parents. The classificatory kinship system
gives Swazi several "fathers" and "mothers" and consequently "sons" and "daughters", but the
obligations to the biological parents and children remain strengest. Füll brothers and sisters have
strong obligations among each other, while the obligations among half siblings are less strict.
In sum, when the conditions characterizing a solidarity group are applied to the homestead, at least
theoretically the homestead is by and large well suited to fonction as such. lts size, composition
and durability are such that it is able to provide (some) social protection to its members. Strong
moral obligations to give and rights to receive exist within the homestead between its members.
Which obligations and rights an individual homestead member has in genera! and at a more
spécifie point in time dépends on her or his social position in thé homestead, which is a combinati-
on of someone's sex, âge, marital status and place in thé kinship system. Reciprocity underlies thé
transfers of means resulting from thèse obligations and rights. The économie conditions of the
homestead will détermine to what extent thé homestead will have means available to redistribute.
In thé following sections I discuss thé impact of migrant labour on thé several conditions which
make a homestead a solidarity group.
3. Migrant Labour and thé Size and Composition of the Homestead
In this section and thé sections hereafter thé 83 homesteads in our sample are differentiated
according to their stage in thé development cycle. Reasons for this differentiation are twofold. In
thé first place thé impact of migrant labour on thé homestead may differ according to thé actual
stage in thé "life-cycle" of the homestead. In thé second place, différences found between home-
steads with migrant labourers and homesteads without them cannot be attributed anymore to
démographie factors, because thé size and composition of the homestead are kept constant for
both migrant and non-migrant homesteads. In this way thé influence of migrant labour can be
better analyzed. Appendix A gives an explanation of the criteria used. Besides, because thé issue of
thé dependenvy ratio is in essence a matter of composition it is also discussed in this section.
The influence of migrant labour on thé size and composition works out in several ways. One of the
most obvious and évident influences on thé size of thé homestead is thé décline of thé number of
résident members, as can be seen from Table 1. Group 1 indicates homesteads without migrant
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labourers and Group 2 indicates homesteads with migrant labourers.
Table 1: Average Size, Number of Migrants and Resident Size of Homesteads
Stage in
Development
Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Group 1
Average
Sire
5.2
8.0
13.4
8.1
3.4
Number of
Migrants
0
0
0
0
0
Résident
Size
5.2
7.8
12.8
8.1
3.4
Group 2
Average
Size
53
83
15.8
9.0
NA.
Number of
Migrants
1.0
1.0
1.8
1.0
NA.
Résident
Size
43
73
13.8
8.0
NA.
Source: Survey 1990
Table 1 shows that the average number of migrants in Group 2 is 1 for ail homesteads except
those in thé stage of consolidation when a large part of homesteads bas two members as migrant
labourers. As homesteads in thé consolidation stage also contain a majority of homesteads with two
or more households (50 percent), this higher figure can be attributed to each household having its
'own' migrant labourer. The average size of thé homestead in terms of homestead résidents is
influencée, of course, in a négative way. In percent of total homestead members the effect on
homesteads in thé establishment stage is much higher than in thé consolidation stage. The slight
différences between résident size and total homestead size in Group 1 is explained by young
absentée children who are temporary résident on other homesteads, because their own parents can
not maintain them or because they live nearer to school then. Far more important than size,
however, is thé composition of thé homestead and how this is influenced by having migrant
labourers. In Table 2 some figures are given on this issue.
A first issue to deal with is thé number of producers versus non-producers. Although thé number
of producers in homesteads under Group 1 and under Group 2 are roughly thé same, thé number
of resident producers are not: in Group 2 less people are available on thé homestead to perform
domestic and agricultural activities, and less productive people are present to take daify care of
non-productive people. This can be seen when looking at thé dependency ratio, which is defined as
thé total number of résidents divided by thé number of resident producers. While in homesteads
without migrant labour thé dependency ratio is at its highest at 3.0, this figure is 4.5 for home-
steads with migrant labour.
Why is thé migrant exduded as a producer when calculating this dependency ratio? One can argue
that migrants send home remittances and in this way contribute to the welfare of those left bebind.
The dependency ratio including thé migrant would not differ from homesteads without migrants.
Table 2: Number of Resident Producers, Dependency Ratio, Percentage of Homesteads
without Male Resident Producers and Percentage of Female Headed Home-
steads
Stage in
Development
Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Group 1
No. of
res. pro-
ducers
1.8
2.8
4.7
3.6
1.6
Depen-
dency
Ratio
3.0
2.9
3.1
2.4
1.8
% without
male res.
producers
16.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
45.5
% female
headed
homcsteads
0.0 (16.7)
0.0
0.0
0.0 (60.0)
0.0 (45.5)
Group 2
No. of
res. pro-
ducers
1.1
2.1
4.8
2.6
NA.
Depen-
dency
Ratio
4.0
4.5
3.1
4.2
NA.
% without
male res.
producers
85.7
40.0
6.3
NA.
NA.
% female
headed
homesteads
71.4
60.0 (30.0)
25.0 (25.0)
333 (33.3)
NA.
Source: Survey 1990
To some extent this is true, but as was outlined in the previous section the daily care of the welfare
of thé non-productive homestead members is thé task of women. This task entails mainly labour
activities. As thé migrants are always mâle, their absence does not affect the "traditional" work load
of the productive women. What, however, happens is that when male productive members leave
the homestead, their "traditional" tasks have to be taken over by women. Especially in the earlier
stages of the development cycle the migration of male members leads to a complete absence of
male productive members on the homestead (see Table 2 under " % without male resident
producers"). In the establishment stage of the homestead 85.7 percent of the homesteads with
migrant labour had no male resident producers. This means that tasks like ploughing the fields,
herding the cattle, construction and repairing, harvesting and representing the homestead becomes
the task of women in addition to their already heavy working load. The time available for taking
care of the non-productive, in the first stages of the development cycle mainly children, will be less,
and this may have negative conséquences for their welfare.
The above observations are narrowly related to the discussion around the so called "female headed
households". The last column in Table 2 shows that in the establishment and expansion stage of the
Group 2 homesteads 71.4 and 60.0 percent respectively are female headed homesteads because of
labour migration. The figures in brackets indicate the additional percentage of female headed
homesteads because of other reasons (mainly death of the male head). Although women are
allowed to perform male activities in cases as described above ("necessity bas no law"), they have
great disadvantages when trying to obtain the means to perform these activities. Appeals for
receiving more land from the chief, getting a tractor or oxen in time for ploughing, receiving help
in construction activities, or help with legal disputes, or in hiring in labour, all hâve a chance to be
less heard and honoured when asked by a woman. Thus, while doing male activities women are
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also hampered in these activities because of lack of support and coopération.
As can be seen from Table 2 the argument mainly holds for relatively "young" homesteads, and
given their size and composition, thèse are already vulnérable homesteads from a solidarity point of
view. Migrant labour increases this vulnerabiüty and has a negative influence on the welfare of the
non-productive members, which will be mainly children. The relatively "older" homesteads have far
more productive members left behind, who will be better able to cope with the extra work load as
it can be spread over several persons.
In Section 2 it was also argued that as a solidarity group the homestead is better off when
productive activities are spread over activities which do not share the same risks. In other words,
by diversifying the sources of income and produce the homesteads can prevent that all produce or
income will be lost at the same time. By engaging in wage labour, part of the homestead produc-
tion is realized outside the homestead, which in itself means a spread of risks. It is often argued
that wage-labour is a useful supplement to the homestead's agricultural produce but whether
migrant labour has a positive or a negative effect on the composition of the homestead in this
respect is open to discussion and should be analyzed by incorporating the other income or produce
generating activities of the homestead. Table 3 présents the extent of diversification of income
sources.
Table 3: Homesteads and the Number of Income Sources (in % of homesteads in each
stage)
Stage in Homes-
tead Develop-
ment Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Group 1
Number of Income Sources
1
0.0
0.0
11.1
20.0
36.4
2
66.7
50.0
33.3
30.0
36.4
3
333
50.0
55.6
50.0
18.2
Group 2
Number of Income Sources
1
14.3
10.0
0.0
0.0
NA.
2
42.9
30.0
0.0
0.0
NA.
3
28.6
40.0
43.8
100.0
NA.
4
143
20.0
56.2
0.0
NA.
Source: Survey 1990
For homesteads without migrant labourers three forms of producing can be distinguished:
subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture and other income-generating activities, often
denoted as rural industry or small-scaJe enterprise activities. In Group 1 only relatively older
homesteads hâve one source of income, being either subsistence agriculture or small scale activities
(rural industry). Given thé composition of thèse homesteads with relatively elderly people and few
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productive members (see Table 2), available labour time is devoted to one activity only. However,
most homesteads in Group 1 hâve two or three income sources. In most cases homesteads with
two sources combine subsistence agriculture with rural industry. In this way food for thé homestead
is directly secured and is supplemented with money to buy other necessary goods. Commercial
agriculture is either an extension of subsistence maize agriculture or involves thé production of
cotton. Homesteads with commercial agriculture hâve mostly three sources of income. Homesteads
having more (productive) members available hâve more labour time that can be spent on income
generating activities. On thé other hand the larger size and thé larger dependency ratios forces
thèse homestead to raise an income as high as possible in order to feed ail mouths.
Looking at Group 2 reveals that a minority of thèse homesteads dépends on wage-labour only as
source of income. Thèse homesteads are, of course, extremely vulnérable because unemployment
would immediately lead to a complète lack of food or income. Many "young" homesteads hâve one
other source of income besides wage-labour, which is in most cases subsistence agriculture. Thèse
homesteads are rarely involved in rural industry: the bulk of thé money is secured by remittances
(see Sections 5 and 6), and there is no time for other income generating activities. Homesteads
with a combination of subsistence agriculture and wage-labour are mostly female headed homeste-
ads. Being often thé only adult member of thé homestead women are not able to go to thé market
to seil their produce. In this way they are forced to do subsistence agriculture, even if they would
have time to be engaged in rural industry. Mainly homesteads in thé consolidation stage hâve
combined migrant labour with ail other produce or income generating activities. For thèse
homesteads migrant labour is not an alternative as in other cases, but is done besides other
activities. Being engaged in all kind of activities thèse homesteads hâve a considérable spread of
risks.
It might be concluded that homesteads in Group 1 and in Group 2 have spread their activities to
thé same extent, except for some homesteads in thé establishment and expansion stage in Group 2.
Only the kind of activities over which productive efforts are spread differ and with this the kind of
risks that are met (see Section 6). Income diversification itself is often seen as a form of coping
with uncertainties. What can be concluded from this section is that "older" homesteads are better
able to diversify income than "younger" homesteads. For thé latter group thé conséquences of risks
will be more sévère than for other homesteads.
4. Labour Migration and thé Durability and Stability of the Homestead
The durability of thé social group is thé third condition for a group to be a solidarity group. The
members of thé homestead must be certain thé group will exist during their life time. It cannot be
expected, however, that thé homestead as a social group did not change during thé last Century. It
has changed in fact, as an elaborate study of Allen (1973) showed. Has migrant labour anything to
do with this, and how did and does it influence thé changes taking place? This question can only be
answered after a short survey of the various changes taking place.
A général idea in development literature is that in a society that develops from a traditional
subsistence society towards a modern economy, extended families develop towards nuclear families,
i.e., husband, wife and children (Murray 1981, United Nations 1986). I distinguish between thé
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process whereby multi-household homesteads are replaced by one-household homesteads and the
process whereby three or more génération homesteads are replaced by two génération homesteads.
Multi-household homesteads generale from polygyny as well as from married sons staying on their
parents' homestead. The decrease of polygyny was already observed by Kuper (1947) and later by
Allen (1973). The introduction of Christianity at the beginning of this Century has slowly lead to a
décline of polygyny. Also there has been a decreasing incidence of married sons staying with own
households on the parental homestead. Kuper (1947:16) reported in this context that the home-
stead was decreasing from the old "multi-household" ideal because of "less need for défense,
greater independence of married couples (particularly Christians) and limitations of land". What is
also suggested in the literature (Allen 1973, Low 1986) is that married sons or brothers leave the
homestead because migrant labour gives young men early opportunities to raise an income allowing
them to establish their own homesteads. For homesteads in the establishment and expansion stage
I found an average age of the head of 36 and 42 years, respectively. Given the average age of 55
years of the heads of homesteads in the consolidation stage one might suggest that homesteads in
earlier stages have broken away from their parent's homestead. A further indication for households
breaking away is the fmding that homesteads in the later stages of the development cycle (fission
and décline) consist only of one household in which a widow or elderly couple live alone with only
one (unmarried) son or daughter. Other children have left the homestead and established their
own homestead. It should be noted, however, that migrant labour cannot be the only reason.
Homesteads in Group l have no migrant labourers but also within this group "young" homesteads
can be found that broke away from their parent's homestead. This might indicate that besides
migrant labour providing early cash opportunities the other reasons mentioned above are equally
important. Respondents in the survey frequently indicated that reasons for households to stay
together on the same site is subject to rather individual décisions nowadays, and not on what
society expect them to do. Migrant labour providing cash could well influence this décision, but I
cannot support this proposition by data.
As we saw, the stability of a solidarity group is also strengthened when it consists of three or more
générations. A conséquence of the earlier break-up of homesteads as described above is that
"young" homesteads consisting of two générations are created and "older" homesteads with only one
or two générations are left behind. Table 4 gives some data showing that in the consolidation and
fission stage the majority of the homesteads has three or more générations, but in the earlier
stages and in the décline stage two générations prevail as could be expected given the way
homesteads are classified. Does 5t also mean that the homestead develops into some nuclear home-
steads? Again, given the way in which homesteads are classified, many nuclear homesteads can be
found ui the establishment stage and in the expansion stage, as can be seen in Table 4. From a
durability point of view and considering the size and composition, these homesteads are less able to
function as solidarity groups than homesteads in other stages. This is aggravated for homesteads in
Group 2, as the husband is absent most of the year. Although migrants send money home, their
unpaid labour efforts cannot be used when the wife cannot work because of contingencies. Help
with activities has to be found outside the homestead, then. The durability of these nuclear
homesteads can be highly questioned, and Murray (1981) has shown for Lesotho that these
homesteads are very unstable. Social and economie contingencies can hardly be coped with and the
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Table 4: Number of Générations on Homesteads and Percentage of Nuclear Home-
steads (by stage in thé development cycle and group)
Stages in Home-
stead Develop-
ment Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Grou
Number of
Générations
on Homestead
2: 100%
2 80%
3 20%
2 12%
3 78%
4 10%
2 20%
3 60%
4 20%
1 36%
2 45%
3 19%
.pi
% Nuclear
Homesteads
100%
40%
0%
0%
0%
Gro
Number of
Générations
on Homestead
1: 14%
2:86%
2:70%
3:30%
2 : 18 %
3:69%
4: 13%
2:33%
3:67%
N. A.
up 2
% Nuclear
Homesteads
86%
40%
0%
0%
N. A.
Source: Survey 1990
homestead will frequently break down. The wife and her children return to her parent's homestead
or to her husband's parent's homestead.
Murray (1981:102-4) warns, however, that nuclear families in developing countries often appear as
nuclear, but this is neither a structural feature of these families nor it does mean social and
économie independence. Firstly, thé nuclear family is just a stage in thé deveiopment cycle and it
will develop into a more than two génération family. Figures above suggest this may also be thé
case in Swaziland. Secondly, nuclear families might appear isolated from their wider environment
because of separate sites, but family gatherings take place for ail sorts of reasons. The conclusion
that separate sites of nuclear homesteads at the same time indicates social and économie
independence, as is thé case in industrialized countries, does not always hold. Also observations in
Swaziland showed that young homesteads, when sited in thé same Community, have strong
relationships with thé parent homestead. Sometimes thé social and économie interaction is so
intensive that homesteads are seperated only geographically but no more than this. The above
conclusions with respect to "nuclearization" on Swazi Nation Land should be treated with care.
In sum, besides other factors, migrant labour affects the durability and stability of the homestead in
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some ways. Migrant labour provides young homestead members with sufficient cash to establish
their own homesteads. In this way households break away from homesteads sooner than in earlier
times. This process also leads to the création of a group of homesteads which are very "young" and
consisting of a nuclear family only. As such these homesteads are relatively vulnérable and
unstable, and less able to fonction as solidarity groups. When young households leave the
homestead, the homestead left behind will also be less stable and durable. Homesteads in the
décline stage also have just one or two générations, consisting of mainly elderly people then. The
social protection of these people is also not guaranteed and becomes more (incertain.
There is one other influence of migrant labour on the durability and stability of the homestead
which I would like to mention. Among social scientists (including economists) it can frequentiy be
heard that oscillating migration for the homesteads involved is a "way of life", of which the
conséquences are fully accepted and integrated in the social and economie organization of the
homestead. However, the prolonged absence of one of the two adults in young families distorts
family life to a large extent and often créâtes psychological problems for the migrant and those left
behind. The stress on women increases and feelings of neglect and loneliness are more common
than superficial surveys suggest. This, in turn, créâtes its own social problems like divorces,
alcoholism and broken families. These problems undermine the homestead as solidarity group and
with a lack of alternative mechanisms that provide social protection a group of people is created
for whom life becomes highly uncertain and füll of insecurity.
5. Labour Migration and Principles of Distribution
For thé homestead to function as a solidarity group, thé existence of moral principles which oblige
homesteads members to give support to those who need it, is a necessary condition. As said in
Section 2, thé principle of reciprocity prevailing among générations and individual members within
thé homestead must ensure that homestead members support each other, also in times of need.
Who bas obligation to give to whom or who is entitled to receive from whom, and at what time,
dépends on someone's social position within thé homestead as determined by someone's sex, âge,
marital status and place in thé kinship System (relationship to the head of the homestead).
Obviously, also feelings of love and affection strengthen thé feeling of responsibility members hâve
towards each other.
The transfers made within thé homestead for social security purposes are intégral part of the
général transfers of means within thé homestead. The claims several homestead members hâve to
thé migrant labourer's means follow from thé total pattern of this intra-homestead (re-)distribu-
tion. Because of his absence the kind of means thé migrant has to offer is money. Returning with
gifts just once a year, it is only in thé form of regulär remittances that thé migrant labourer can
contribute to thé général welfare of thé homestead, including social protection for thé non-
productive members. As long as thé migrant labourer fulfils his monetary obligations towards those
left behind thé reciprocity principle seems not be in danger and thé homestead as solidarity group
will continue to function quite well in this respect. What does reality shows us?
To start with, Table 5 présents some data on the remittances send home by the migrant labourer.
It should be clear that only homesteads of Group 2 are included in the analysis in this section.
Table 5: Percentage of Homesteads receiving Remittances, Share of Remittances in
Total Disposable Income, Percentage of Total Income Migrant send Home,
Remittances per Resident Member, by stage in the development cycle
Stages in Ho-
mestead Deve-
lopment Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
% of Homesteads
receiving Remit-
tances
100%
90%
87.5 %
100%
NA.
Share (%) of Re-
mittances in Total
Disposable Inco-
me Homestead1'
87%
59%
46%
NA.
NA.
Remittances
as % of Mi-
grant's Total
Income
27%
18%
19%
NA.
NA.
Remittances per
Resident Ho-
mestead Mem-
ber (E')2)
620
171
193
NA.
NA.
1) The Total Disposable Income of thé Homestead includes monetary earnings from commercial
agriculture and rural industry, remittances, and thé sales value of maize subsistence production.
2) E' = Emalangeni (Sing. Lilangeni), which is équivalent to 0.36 US Dollar (June 1992)
Source: Survey 1990
The figures in Table 5 suggest that most migrants send money home. Few homesteads do not
receive any significant remittances. Large différences exist, however, between homesteads in thé
establishment stage and homesteads in thé expansion and consolidation stage. In thé former case
remittances make up 87 percent of thé total homestead income, while in the later stages this figure
déclines. Reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, in thé expansion and consolidation stage thé
homesteads hâve more income sources than subsistence agriculture and remittances only. Table 3
already led to this conclusion. Consequently thé share of remittances in thé total disposable income
is less. But secondly, as also can be seen in Table 5, the percentage of thé wage income of the
migrant that is received by thé homestead déclines.4 How to explain this phenomenon? An
important explanation could be thé social status of thé migrant labourer himself and thé responsi-
4
 Note that the percentages given in Table 5 are very rough indications and are probably an
underestimation of real figures. In thé fïrst place, not all homestead members were asked to report
thé remittances they receive from absentées and, secondly, a migrant labourer often bas obligations
towards people living outside his homestead as well (see also Russell 1984). Thirdly, the migrant
sends not only regulär remittances but also money for particular purposes like buying a tractor,
payment of school fées, and so on. In thèse cases the percentages in thé second and third column
would be higher than is suggested hère.
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buit)« this involves. Migrants belonging to homesteads in the establishment stage are at the same
tune head of the homestead. This implies that they have füll responsibility for the welfare of all
BÓmestead members. Several other sources (Allen 1973, Murray 1978, Rosen-Prinz and Prinz)
indicate that this responsibility is taken seriously by the migrant and expresses itself in the amount
of remittances send home. In contrast, the heads of the homesteads in the expansion and
consolidation stage are in many cases present on the homestead. Given their average age they have
less chance to get a job as migrant labourer and the many daily affairs of his large homestead
« combined with social control forces him to stay at his homestead. The migrants of these home-
steads, then, are mostly young unmarried male which want to escape social and economie control
of the head and the slow pace of life in the rural areas. These migrants have quite other motiv-
ations to migrate than the young head with strong feelings of responsibility (Rosen-Prinz and Prinz
1978). Still the young migrants of Stage 2 and 3 homesteads have obligations towards homestead
'iaembers, especially the parents. When a young unmarried male is the heir of the homestead hè
will probabiy follow up his father as head and send remittances home to ensure his position, but
yming unmarried male with no chance at all to have a future share in their father's possessions and
wealth may be interested only in making as much money as possible to establish their own home-
« stead. Sending money home only hampers this objective. Although the homestead in the consolida-
tion stage has relatively more members in wage labour (1.8, see Table 1), it may hâve less profit
ïess from them for this reason.
However, this behaviour of young unmarried migrants may hâve repercussions for their rights in
thé long term. The way in which oscillating labour migration opérâtes causes migrants to return
home after two or three years. This is also the case when they fall sick or are not able to finish
their contract because of other reasons. For thé migrant, thé homestead is thé base to which he
wilt i return and which will provide him social protection as far as possible. When thé migrant
neglects his obligations towards homestead members this behaviour might induce thé homestead to
be less willing to support thé returning migrant. Further research, however, will be needed to verify
whether or not such behaviour actuaUy takes place.
Another important observation in the context of this section is derived from a study from Russell
(1984) on thé redistribution of cash in Swazi society. A major conclusion of her study is that
remittances are not just send "home" but to a range of spécifie individuals to whom, because of
spécifie relationships, migrants feel a particular obligation (Russell 1984:4). Kinship relations
indicate thé Unes of responsibility. Therefore, a migrant will send money to thé household in whose
kitchen he eats, thé kitchen of the woman feeding his children, thé women he sleeps with, his
mother and father (which may be several "fathers" and "mothers" because of thé classificatory
kinship system5) and grandparents.
With a classificatory kinship system a given person has several people he or she calls
"father", "mother", "sister", and so on. Intimacy with and responsibility for thèse classificatory kin
are ordered and well ranked by well understood principles of the logic of lineage, affinity and birth
order. In Swaziland, for example, a man's first father is his biological father, but if thé biological
father should fail or die, then father's eldest brother becomes father. "Father" has obligations to
"child", and "child" has obligations to "father" (Russell 1984:11).
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Another interesting observation of Russell is that the control over money in Swazi society is highly
individualised and the spending is at the discrétion of the earners. However, the exchanges of the
earned money are still part of the broader pattern of reciprocity, which is highly generalised.
Money remittances, therefore, circulate as guts and it is still considered very ill-mannered to
immediately reciprocate a gift. The introduction of money within the pattern of reciprocity créâtes
its own problems because money as a gift threatens to transform generalised reciprocity into
carping calculation (Russell 1984:2). The idea behind generalised reciprocity is that I can receive
something from someone to whom I did never give. On the other hand, I give to people from
whom I will never receive. This generaüsed reciprocity is the base of the redistribution of means
for social security purposes, and ensures that people receive what they need. Because the
possession of money is highly individualised, people give money with the idea that they will receive
the same amount from the same person in return (or goods which are equivalent to the amount
given). Money introduces calculation, therefore, and people will calculate their debts or crédits
towards each other. The result might be that people do not receive anymore what they need, with
all conséquences for their welfare. In this way migrant labour might undermine the principle of
generalised reciprocity underlying the homestead's capacity to function as solidarity group.
6. Labour Migration and the Economie position of the Homestead
The last question referred to in this paper is the question to what extent labour migration
influences the economie position of the homestead, i.e., its capacity to raise means which can be
used for redistribution between productive and non-productive members. At first sight one could
say that labour migration will provide homesteads with an extra income. But labour migration also
means loss of productive power at home and this may negatively influence agricultural produce and
rural industry. Table 6 is given to indicate average homestead disposable income and thé différent
sources from which it is realized.
A first conclusion from Table 6 can be that homesteads with migrant labour do not have a higher
disposable income than homesteads without migrant labour. Only homesteads which are in thé
consolidation stage raise a higher income when they are involved in wage labour than homesteads
without migrant labourers. This means in essence that migrant labour and thé remittances it
générâtes hardly influence thé économie position of homesteads in ternis of the level of disposable
income. Homesteads without migrant labour receive a large share of their means by income
generaled in commercial agriculture (cotton or maize) and rural industry. Also subsistence
production has a larger share in thé disposable income than for homesteads with migrant labour.
However, ending this section with this observation would not be satisfactory. Not only thé level of
thé disposable income is important when assessing thé économie position, but also the conditions
under which production takes place and thé intra-homestead distribution of income and wealth
hâve to be included. How is labour migration related to thèse issues?
Homesteads with migrant labourers and those without migrants realize their production in différent
ways and under différent conditions. The two groups of homesteads are integrated differently in
thé wider economy. The latter homesteads realize their income by producing maize, cash crops and
handicrafts. The former homesteads realize their income by selling their labour power on thé
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Table 6: Average Disposable Homestead Income"^ and thé Share of Income Generating
Activities in thé Disposable Homestead Income > •
Stage in Dev.
Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Group 1
Disp.
Income
3100
4480
4140
2370
1190
Share of Activities in Income
Subs.
Agt.
0.07
0.25
0.18
0.10
0.17
Com.
Agt.
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.23
0.10
O.I.GA.
0.72
0.54
0.51
0.49
0.57
Remitt.
0.00
0.00
0.11
0.18
0.16
Group 2
Disp.
Income
2760
2750
4900
4480
NA.
Share of Activities in Income
Subs.
Agt.
0.08
0.10
0.08
NA.
NA.
Comm.
Agt.
0.02
0.06
0.17
NA.
NA.
O.I.GA.
0.03
0.15
0.29
NA.
NA.
Remitt.
0.87
0.59
0.46
NA.
NA.
*) Homestead Disposable Income = Sales Value of Maize Subsistence Production + Income from
Commercial Agricultural + Income from Other Income Generating Activities (O.I.GA.) +
Remittances (in E.)
Source: Survey 1990
labour market. Homesteads without migrant labour dépend for part of their activities on the input
and output markets and part on the natura! environment, and are subject to fluctuations in these
markets and to fluctuations in ecological and natural conditions. Homestead with migrant labour
are dependent on the fluctuating and highly unstable labour market. In this way, as also said in
Section 3, the economie position of the homesteads with migrant labour is exposed to other risks
than that of homesteads without migrant labourers. For the former type, with their high depend-
ence on income from wage-labour only, unemployment and décline in wages are likely to have
large impacts on their welfare. This stands in contrast with homesteads without migrant labour, of
which produce and income are better spread over several activities and hence are subject to
different risks. In sum, as migrant labour leads to homesteads involved in other markets than
homesteads without migrant labour, and therefore face different conditions, their economie
position is threatened by different risks.
Narrowly related to the above issue is that homesteads without migrant labour have all their
productive activities at home, which means that the local institutional setting will have large
influences on their economie position. The extent to which land is available and distributed among
homesteads, agricultural and infrastructural projects are initiated, and the homestead can have
politica! influence has large impacts on the economie position. Homesteads with migrant labour are
for their economie position less dependent on the local institutional and politica! setting and are,
therefore, less vulnérable to phenomena like, for example, land scarcity and unequal distribution
of land.
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The intra-homestead distribution of the disposable income also differs between the two sets of
homesteads. Labour migration to South Africa is male dominated. This means that the wages
earned accrue in first instance to male homestead members. Rural industry activities like beer
brewing, making mats and baskets, knitwork, tailoring, and so on, are female dominated. Income
from these activities will fall upon women. Income from agricultural activities accrues to both men
and women. As explained in Section 2 women keep their own maize production in store. Men keep
the production from the "grandmother's field" and receive the money when maize or cotton is sold.
Women receive money when they seil vegetables from their garden. It was stated that the daily
care of the non-productive homestead members is a task of women. It can be assumed, then, that
of the income which accrues to women a larger part will be spent on the genera! welfare of the
homestead, including the care of non-productive members, while income earned by men is to a
lesser extent spent on the genera! welfare of the homestead. Studies (SSRU 1990, Russell 1984) on
this issue confirm this assumption.
Unless remittances are sent to women, the economie position of the homesteads without migrant
labour can be more positively valued from a social security point of view than the economie
position of homesteads with migrant labour, because intra-homestead distribution of income and
produce is more directed towards the women. In case remittances are sent to women it can be
expected that these will be spent largely on the genera! welfare of the homestead. Main différence
with homesteads without migrant labour remains, however, that in the former case women have
more control over monetary earnings because they earn the money with their own activities. In this
way women also have more control over the use of this money.
Last issue in this section is whether there is any relationship between the wealth of homesteads and
migrant labour. Because land cannot be privately owned, private savings are the main form of
wealth. In situations of low real interest rates savings can be best invested in "real estate", which is
mainly cattle in the Swazi case. Table 7 présents some figures on cattlc ownership.
Table 7 shows that différences with respect to cattle ownership do exist between homesteads with
and without migrant labour. However, it is difficult to say whether this can be attributed to migrant
labour or not. As in many African societies cattle is only partly obtained from thé market. As cattle
is, besides money, thé main item in which thé bride priée is paid, homesteads obtain cattle also in
other ways. Partly for this reason homesteads in thé consolidation stage hâve more cattle than in
other stages: daughters are getting married and homesteads receive cattle when thé daughter
leaves. Moreover, cattle is accumulated, through breeding and through thé market, in order to pay
thé bride priée when sons of thé homesteads get married. Ail this might explain différences
between stages in thé development cycle, but not between migrant and non-migrant homesteads.
Tentatively three possible explanations for this finding can be put forward. Firstly, homesteads with
migrant labourers hâve more money available than homesteads without. This means that home-
steads with migrant labour can more easily acquire cattle from thé market and are not solely
dépendent on non-market transfers of cattle (payments of bride priée mainly). Secondly, related to
thé issue of thé distribution of income and produce, in homesteads with migrant labour more
income accrues to men than in homesteads without migrants. As thé main responsibility of the man
(at least the head) is to ensure the long-term survival of the homestead he will invest nis savings in
cattle to reach this objective. In this way he also guarantees some form of social protection for the
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Table 7: Percentage of Homesteads owning Cattle and Average Number of Cattle
owned (by stage in the development cycle)
Stage in Devel-
opment Cycle
Establishment
Expansion
Consolidation
Fission
Décline
Group 1
% Homesteads
owning cattle
67.7
50.0
75.0
40.0
54.5
Average Num-
ber of Cattle
7.8
6.4
16.8
19.0
6.0
Group 2
% Homesteads
owning Cattle
100.0
90.0
93.7
100.0
NA.
Average Num-
ber of Cattle
9.3
10.4
16.4
3.5
NA.
Source: Survey 1990
homestead in case he will get unemployed. Women are responsible for short-term économie
décisions related to daily survival. They will spend their money on goods and items necessary for
daily survival (see also Raatgever 1988). Homesteads without migrant labour do hâve a more equal
distribution of means between men and women, but at the same time less male savings are
available to invest in cattle. In homesteads with migrant labour this is the other way round. A third
reason for thé différence found might be that men who migrate are usually young men who still
have to pay their marriage cattle or part of it, while the men staving at home are more settled and
already hâve fulfilled their bride price payments. With this explanation différences in cattle
ownership are explained by thé life cycle of individual members rather than by thé homestead
development cycle.
7. Conclusions
For thé majority of thé population of Swaziland, thé homestead is the most important social and
économie unit in Swazi society. Providing social protection to ils members is one its functions.
Given thé various conditions that a solidarity group has to satisfy, we find that thé homestead is
indeed theoretically capable of performing its protective function. In this paper the central question
was how labour migration of homestead members to South Africa affects thé homestead as
solidarity group. To answer this question I tried to indicate relationships between migrant labour
and thé several conditions that make a social group to function as a solidarity group.
The influence of migrant labour on thé size of thé homestead is évident, but has no major
conséquences as long as remittances are sent home. Migrant labour influences thé composition of
thé homestead in several ways. The résident producers, which are mainly women, hâve to perform
more tasks and indirectly this will influence thé daily care of the non-productive members.
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Moreover, labour migration gives rise to "female-headed households", which hâve a difficult
position in Swazi social relations. Labour migration does, however, diversify thé income sources of
thé homestead and thé covariance of risks is less than for homesteads with home-based production.
In this way migrants may make thé homestead less vulnérable.
The durability and stability of homesteads are also influenced by migrant labour. Labour migration
gives opportunities for young men to raise own bcome and establish their own homestead. They
hâve an opportunity to break away from thé parental homestead. This breaking-up causes a
"nuclearization" of homesteads. Although thé observation that nuclear homesteads exist should be
treated with care, these homesteads must be considered hardly capable to function as solidarity
group. The process of breaking-up also gives rise to homesteads containing two générations or less.
Due to this fact homesteads are less capable to function as solidarity groups. Labour migration
might also threaten thé durability and stability of a homestead by creating other social problems
like alcoholism, divorces, and so on.
With respect to thé principle of "normative insurance" within homesteads, implying generalised
reciprocity, labour migration has its impact by introducing money in thé sphère of redistribution. In
Swazi society money is individually owned and its use is at thé discrétion of those who have it.
Although money is transferred by thé principle of reciprocity, this reciprocity becomes less
generalised, thus threatening thé main principle underlying intra-homestead solidarity.
The influence of migrant labour on thé économie position of thé homestead is mixed. It seems to
provide homesteads with greater wealth, but it does not provide substantially more income to thé
homestead compared with homesteads without migrant labour. It must be said that thé remittances
might be higher than suggested in this paper because of non-monetary contributions. If this is the
case, thé homesteads with migrant labour will probably be provided with more means than those
without. Intra-homestead distribution of income between sexes seems to become more mâle biased
in homesteads engaged in migrant labour. This might lead to a situation in which less means
become available for thé général welfare of the homestead.
In sum, thé impact of labour migration on thé homestead as solidarity group is mixed, but I think
it can be concluded that on balance it is négative. However, thé extent to which labour migration
influences individual homesteads as solidarity groups dépends on thé stage of thé homestead in thé
development cycle. Homesteads in thé consolidation stage will feel less negative conséquences
when one of its members migrâtes and may even profit from it, while "younger" homesteads
become very vulnérable in thé sensé of being less able to deal with social and économie contin-
gencies.
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Appendix A: Criteria used for Classification of Homesteads
For the classification of homesteads according to their stage in the development cycle, the criteria
outlined in Table A were used.
Table A: Criteria used to classify homesteads according to their place in the homestead
development cycle
Criteria /
Homestead Fre-
quency
Homestead Size
Age of Head
Children
< 15 years
Child / Population
Ratio
Frequency own
sample
% of Total
Sample Low
Homestead Development Cycle
Stage 1
Establishment
(a) 1 - 3a
(b) 1 - 6b
(a) < 40a
(b) < 50b
(a) 0
(b) > 0
13
15.6
12.0
Stage 2
Expansion
7-10
(a) < 50a
(b) < 55b
(a) 0.24
(b) 0.49
20
24.1
22.1
Stage 3
Consolidation
> 10
25
30.1
26.5
Stage 4
Fission
7- 10
Other
than
Stage 2
13
15.6
203
Stage 5
Décline
1-6
Other
than
Stage 1
12
14.6
19.1
Sources: Adapted from Low (1986:83), Table 7.17
Survey 1990
In his study Low (1986) uses a five stage typology formulated by Fortes (1970) for the homestead
development cycle: establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission and décline. The criteria used to
distinguish the stages are homestead size, homestead composition and the so-called con-
sumers/workers ratio. In Table A these criteria are represented by homestead size, the age of the
head and the children/population ratio respectively. Homesteads are in the establishment stage (a)
when the homestead size is between l and 3, the age of the head is below 40 years and no children
are on the homestead, or else (b) when its size is between l and 6 members, the age of the head is
below 50 years and any children under 16 years old are present. Other homesteads with l till 6
members are in the décline stage when the above conditions are not fulfdled. Homesteads are in
the stage of expansion when (a) the size ranges from 7 till 10 persons, the age of the head is below
50 years and the children/population ratio is greater than 0.24, or else (b) when the age of the
26
head is below 55 years and the children/population ratio is greater than 0.49. All other homesteads
between 7 and 10 members are supposed to be in the fission stage. The consolidation stage
contains homesteads with a size that exceeds 10 persons.
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